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SIN AND SINFULNESS 
- Hugh Connolly - 
We are separated fiom the mystery, the depth and 
the greatness of our existence. We hear the voice 
of that depth; but our ears are closed. We feel that 
something radical, total and unconditional is 
demanded of us; but we rebel against it, try to 
escape its urgency and will not accept its promise 
... Sin in its most profound sense, sin as despair 
abounds among us. (Paul Tillich, The Shaking of 
the Foundations) 
The idea that men and women are morally responsible outside 
of particular social practices and conventions of praise and 
blame requires at the very least a conception of someone to 
whom or something to which they are responsible. To the 
Judaeo-Christian mind the immediate tribunal before which the 
self is summoned has always been 'conscience upon which is 
engraved the law of God'. Norms of responsibility are not 
therefore to be to simply considered a matter of individual 
choice, or preference, or even social convention. Ultimately the 
individual is responsible for herself or himself and the demand 
for an authentic coherent ethical stance is thus fundamental to 
the moral life.' 
Ethics in the Christian tradition presupposes therefore 
accountability, answerability and responsibility. These notions 
are the means by which we also attribute culpability to persons. 
William Kneale has noted that moral reasoning 'began with an 
extended use of debt words' and that the language of debt also 
'permeates religious discourse'.' Religious debate, in turn, and 
in particular Christian theological ethcs, affirms that the 
coherence and integrity of life is fundamentally linked to what 
transcends individual and community life - namely God. This 
insight gives rise to an 'imperative of responsibility' which in 
some sense articulates the prophetic call to seek justice, love 
and mercy and walk humbly before God? 
Responsibihty is therefore a core tenet of the Christian faith 
- responsibility to oneself, to others and to God. This 
'expectation of response', as Niebuhr calls it, encapsulates the 
Christian imperative to turn away fiom attitudes and behaviour 
which demean and destroy the integrity of life and to move 
toward a moral stance which respects, enhances and promotes 
right relations. It follows then that failure to respond, fdure  to 
strive toward right relations, and failure to be fdly responsible 
is the very essence of sin. This understanding underscores the 
inadequacy by itself of a 'debt-language' that places too much 
reliance on those models of law and obedience that tend to 
characterise and indeed caricature sin in a mechanical, 
individualistic and actualistic way. 
Equally inadequate and unhelpll is the removal of debt 
language altogether or its replacement with a vocabulary and 
imagery of fault that relieves persons of all responsibility for 
their actions. Those psychological, sociological and 
anthropological approaches that advocate what might be called a 
'hard determinism' may succeed in their own terms in lifting the 
burden of g d t  fiom the shoulders of the sinner. They do this at 
the cost, though, of severely diluting our understanding of 
personal freedom and of rendering the ethical dimension well- 
nigh irrelevant. Wiping out g d t  by wiping out the very identity 
and self-understanding of the person is, by any standards, a 
rather crude approach. Besides, it would seem that even in terms 
of the therapeutic goal the strategy is not an entirely successful 
one.4 There is a tension, a tensive quality in the concept of sin, 
which must be respected and retained if the term is not to be 
devalued and to lose all currency and meaning. The urge to 
counter a reductionist or deflated account of sin with an 
expansionist, inflated by ultimately trivialised understanding, is 
great but must be resisted. The answer must therefore be a more 
nuanced and synthetic approach. 
That said, an important service has been rendered in 
disentangling, insofar as that is possible, the separate notions of 
psychological hurt and moral guilt. One can indeed resonate 
with Denis Potter's observation that all too often religion was 
'the wound and not the bandage'.' There are 'guilt laden 
counterfeits of responsibility', human projections which often 
do 'colonise religious experience' and have the capacity to 
damage and distort one's image of God and of self. Theological 
ethics owes a real debt to the modern sciences for their work in 
exposing such counterfeits and in highlighting the dangers and 
deficiencies of a theology of sin which becomes too 
preoccupied with precise deterrents and precise merits. Sin and 
its remission can too easily be reduced to some manner of 
theological calculus. Misguided methods of evangelization and 
exhortation, which either wittingly or unwittingly inflate the 
understanding of guilt in order to manipulate it, are ultimately 
perverting the Gospel message of good news and at least to 
some extent are guilty of producing what Nietzsche called 'a 
slave m~rality ' .~ 
While it is true that Christianity brings with it a perception 
of the human being as guilty in its doctrine of Original Sin, this 
teaching only has relevance in the context of Jesus' liberation of 
all humanity in his passion and death. Original Sin is therefore 
essentially about the detection of and 'unmasking of a lie'. The 
lie in turn, as we have already suggested, is a distorted and 
flawed self-image which has become internalised and which 
orients us toward a 'dehumanising self-sufficiency and self- 
justification'.' A wholesome, synthetic account of original sin 
therefore, far from being at odds with balanced psychological 
and sociological insights, is in fact engaged in large measures in 
one and the same project - namely the unmasking of flawed 
images of God, of self and of the world in which we live. It has 
been a constant theme of Christian theology from the time of 
St Paul that divine grace enables us to avoid sin. This implies, 
however, an acknowledgement of the fact of human 
wrongdoing, infidelity, selfishness and so forth and of one's 
accountability for failure. Responsibility and sin are therefore 
corollaries of each other. In other words, 'to establish the 
possibility of sin is always simultaneously to confirm the 
potentialities of human agency and human nature and so, in 
the final analysis, sin is not an indictment of human nature but 
a vindication of it.There is a paradox then, an 'inherent irony' 
in that the very theological concept which more than any other 
depicts the fragility of the human person and the fragmentary 
nature of our engagement with the moral life also celebrates 
the human capacity for change and for the good. This paradox 
at the heart of the doctrine of sin means that, despite having to 
grapple with the reality of failure, the teaching bears witness to 
a very positive underlying theological anthropology, 
Viewed in this light it is not altogether surprising that the 
idea of sin has fallen on such difficult times in the last half- 
century or so. Modern western thought has tended t o  abandon 
the notion of the Imago Dei and with it the idea of the intrinsic 
worth and dignity of the self. Hans Jonas observes: 'the paradox 
of the modern condition is that this reduction of man's stature, 
the utter humbling of this metaphysical pride, goes hand in 
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hand with his promotion to quasi-God-like privilege and 
power'.' Whatever about the centrality or otherwise of t h s  
'will to power', there are two very different and competing 
theological anthropologies or accounts of humanity at play 
here. The first one, which asserts the sinful nature of the 
human condition, seems on the face of it to be a gloomy 
assessment but is in fact the gateway to an exalted 
understanding of human persons as created in the image of the 
three-in-one God. Here, each person is viewed as a unique, 
distinct and unrepeatable person. Each human being has a 
personal, existential distinctiveness and because of their 
personal communion with God each partakes in Being, each is 
therefore more than their biological individuality. 
Unlike the second anthropology, which presents the person 
as an 'individual', a segment or a sub-division of human nature 
as a whole, the Christian understanding of person is different in 
that it 'represents not the relationship of a part to the whole but 
the possibility of summing up the whole in a distinctiveness of 
relationship in an act of self-transcendence'.1° In a remarkable 
way every man and woman encapsulates in his or her own 
existence the universality of human nature. And this existence 
is characterised by freedom and distinctiveness. Each human 
being is given the invitation and the offer of freedom in love 
and in personal communion. Each may accept or refuse the 
offer, which is essentially a choice between going along with 
the process of being or cutting oneself off from being together. 
Evidently at the root of these differing anthropologies there 
are conflicting views of freedom. Modern western liberal 
thought has gradually moved away from the idea that freedom 
may be guided by truth about what is good. Some of the 
existential philosophers (for example John Paul Sartre) have for 
instance put forward an 'ethc of authenticity' where freedom 
is understood in a radical way, almost as a law unto itself. Sin, 
in this philosophical outlook, insofar as it has any meaning, is 
about failure to break the shackles which hamper authenticity 
- natural law, religious belief and external value systems. To 
live authentically one must live radically, and if one lives 
virtuously one does so, in the words of Camus, only 'by 
caprice'. 
If there is nothing definitive in nature, no 
structure in its products, which responds to a 
purpose, then it is licit to do with it whatever one 
wants, without by this violating its integrity. For 
there is no integrity in a nature conceived 
- exclusively in terms of natural science in a nature 
that is neither created nor creative. " 
The productive and social changes of the last two centuries 
have vastly multiplied our choices, and with this has come the 
championing of the right to choose. Someone has described 
modernity as the transition from fate to choice. Freedom has 
been exalted as a core value. But freedom is nevertheless elusive 
and unsatisfying and is too often confused with independence. 
The result is the relentless pursuit of a phantom freedom that 
is in fact only a new form of enslavement. 
Homo modemus, whether as a taxpayer, worker or consumer, 
is increasingly considered a mere digit, a unit of production, 
consumption or fiscal reckoning. Emptied of the respect, 
dignity and indeed of the love due to a person, the human 
being becomes increasingly viewed as a thing. Man turns into a 
grain of sand and human society becomes a desert. The 
relentless pursuit of freedom that severs the 'ties' of religion 
and off-loads the 'prejudices' of tradition and morality leads 
only to a mirage. Perhaps part of the wrath and bitterness that 
was unleashed in sometimes anarchic and violent anti- 
globalisation protests at the beginning of the third millennium 
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was due to this lund of growing disillusionment. There is an 
increasing realisation that grandiose promises of freedom have 
led not to real liberation but only to the dull conformity of 
fashion and to the influences of the utterly hollow and 
ephemeral. In the same way the irony of the Judaeo-Christian 
stance is that it is an ethic that at first glance appears 
constricting and even suffocating but which in fact holds out the 
promise of real freedom. 
The key of course is in the acceptance of the human being 
as essentially relational. Viewed in this light, the ties that really 
bind us are not bonds of imprisonment at all but bonds of 
attachment of communion and of love. The freedom we enjoy 
is a 'created fieedom', and therefore the fundamental choice is 
not really between dependence and independence: it is a 
decision between a living dependence, which is open to growth 
and development, and a dead dependence, which refuses to 
acknowledge our creature status and therefore cuts us off from 
the sources of life. 
These competing versions of fieedom were also to form the 
backdrop to the 1994 papal encyclical Vkritatis Splertdor and to the 
episode of the rich young man's encounter with Jesus (Mt 19:16- 
22) which inspired and informed the encyclical's reflections on 
this topic. Jesus' response to the young man's enquiry about what 
he must do to gain eternal life was prefaced by a reminder that 
human good or moral good fmds its ultimate source in the 
absolute good - the 'one who is good'. The aspirations to 
fieedom and to the good are but particular articulations of the 
desire for the infmite. In this way 'human fieedom bursts open to 
dimensions for which only God is the answer because only the 
absolute Good satisfies the restless heart'." 
Evidently future receptivity to a doctrine or even a sense of 
sin are inextricably linked to humanity's willingness to remain 
open to the transcendent. Sin can only be truly understood in 
terms of the living and personal bond between humanity and 
God, which is in turn the foundation of all human 
relationships. That is why 'the second commandment is like the 
first'. To love one's neighbour as oneself is, above all, to respect 
the freedom that he or she holds from God. As Paul explained 
in his image of the 'Body of Christ', each member of the living 
organism develops freely so long as it is intimately joined to the 
rest of the body So the foundation for the injunction to love 
one's neighbour as oneself is the intimate relationship and 
relatedness of human beings. I love you not because you are 
giving me th s  or that, but because in a certain sense I am you 
and you are I in communion with our common source which is 
the triune God. This is the idea that is the common focus, the 
synthesis and the regulating centre of all our individual 
freedoms." 
If such are the philosophical and theological underpinnings 
of the Judaeo-Christian account of sin it should also be 
acknowledged that it has been the genius of the same tradtion 
to propose side by side with the formal doctrine of repentance 
a tradition of sacrament, ritual and religious practice. T h s  has 
provided another means by which to understand and to 
concretely experience the mystery of sin and conversion. 
Recourse is made here above all to the language of symbol, 
metaphor and b o d y  enactment (which is the language of 
Scripture after all) in its attempt to embrace in a holistic and 
accessible way the human experience of wrongdoing, 
repentance and reorientation. In more recent times this kind of 
indirect language has attracted the attention of philosophers 
such as Paul Ricoeur and RCnt Girard who have shown how 
symbolic and mimetic communication can speak beyond logic 
to the human heart. In particular they have drawn attention to 
what Ricoeur calls the 'double intentionality' of metaphor, that 
is, the literal and latent layers of meaning. 
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Symbols and metaphors give rise to a 'spontaneous 
hermeneutics', a struggle toward newer and fuller levels of 
meaning. This insight has led to several attempts in recent years 
to revitalise and re-energise the theological language of sin by 
re-examining the underpinning imagery. More particularly, 
these theological initiatives have sought to shift the emphasis 
away from juridical/criminal models which tend to reinforce a 
highly individualistic anthropology toward more therapeutic 
and communitarian paradigms which successfully evoke the 
universal struggle with the crippling and disintegrating power 
of sin." These approaches are at once more coherent with the 
wider scope of biblical wisdom and more receptive also to the 
interdisciplinary, synthetic approaches that are found in recent 
theological debate and research. But they are only useful 
insofar as they are tolerant of the actual blend of metaphor and 
imagery, which emerges from the scriptural and doctrinal 
tradition. There is no one paradigm or metaphor that holds the 
definitive key to the understanding of sin. Each must dialogue, 
modify and, as Ricoeur puts it, 'struggle' with the others. Any 
attempt to underplay the 'juridical' model for instance would 
be just as misconceived and misguided as the well-documented 
tendency to overlay what it formerly was. 
Among these theological voices the contribution of those 
writing from the political, ecological, liberationist and feminist 
perspectives have also been very much to the fore. While 
feminist theologians have tended to concentrate less on the 
theme of sin and more on the patriarchal identification of 
women with sin, their work has on occasions lucidly 
demonstrated how prone our religious imagery and 
theological paradgms are to &stortion and bias. Such bias they 
contend may also express itself in ethical theory and in the basic 
understanding of the moral life. Spiritual and moral machismo, 
for instance, may be found in inordinate preoccupation with 
victory over individual sins to the neglect of responsibility for 
nourishing and nurturing relationships." Some critiques go 
much further and argue that there is a tendency within 
traditional conceptions of morality to legitimate so-called 
'feminine virtues' thereby actually perpetuating injustice and 
oppression. Whatever the validity of these claims, there is no 
doubt that feminist thinkers have done a great service in high- 
lighting the 'sin' of sexism. The blatant dishonesty at the root 
of a 'belief that gender is the primary determinant of human 
characteristics, traits, abilities and talents and that sexual 
differences produce an inherent superiority of a particular sex'I6 
has been exposed for once and for all. 
This theological critique also raises questions about the 
accuracy of hubris as a type for universal sin since this very 
concept 'mirrors chiefly the experience of men' who aspire to 
positions of power and influence." But perhaps this criticism 
implies a too facile identification between hubris and the 
traditional Judaeo-Christian conception of sin. The latter, as we 
have tried to point out, was more concerned with an integral 
account of human sinfulness, of which hubris was but one 
expression. To be sure, the classical theological conceptualisation 
of sin has its limitations. Nevertheless the underlying 
understanding of sin as a negation of who one truly is called to 
be rendered this theology at least potentially open and receptive 
to new experiences of sin such as those evoked today by those 
who reflect feminist, ecological and social concerns. What is 
more, there would seem to be some validity in the arguments of 
those who suggest that the notion that 'men sin through pride 
and women through weakness' is itself a stereotype which has 
become a little dated at the beginning of the third millennium." 
Even so, patriarchal structures and sexist attitudes are still a 
reality in society generally and in Christian churches and 
communities more particularly. Like liberation theologians, 
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feminists have drawn inspiration from the central prophetic 
tradition of Judaeo-Christian ethics which emphasised God's 
defence of the oppressed, as well as the need to criticise 
oppressive power structures in society and the importance of 
recognising ideological elements in religious belief. They have 
also critiqued an overly spiritualised account of original sin that 
fails to respect the 'earthedness' and bodiLiness of human life. 
Reuther argues: 
The Big Lie tells us that we are strangers and 
sojourners on this planet, that our flesh, our blood, 
our instincts for survival are our enemies. We have 
fallen to this earth and into this clay through 
accident or sin. We must spend our lives 
suppressing our hungers and thirsts and shunning 
our fellow beings so that we can dematerialise and 
fly away to the stars." 
It is one thing to acknowledge with the author of the Letter to 
the Hebrews that 'we have here no abiding city'; it is quite 
another to use this as an excuse for avoiding the individual and 
societal responsibilities which are an essential part of our 
human calling. 
But feminists such as Reuther do see within the tradition 
seeds of a new way of imaging God, sin, conversion and so forth. 
They point to the maternal love and compassion of Yahweh, the 
presence of Wisdom conceived of as a feminine reality, and the 
as-yet underdeveloped female imagery associated with the work 
of the Holy Spirit. Although there is a great variety and 
divergence of opinion and of intensity among feminist 
reflections on sin, one senses here a thrust toward a more fully 
human and inclusive understandmg of fault and finitude. 
Construed in this way the universal sinful tendency 'consists 
essentially in denying the co-humanity of the others one 
experiences'." Such reflections have made an invaluable 
contribution to unmasking the dehumanising side of sin. In 
doing so they are broadly at one with theologians who argue that 
sin is essentially about refusing the invitation to play our part in 
the human family's journey towards becoming more fully 
human." The fact that Christian theology, and in particular its 
reflection on sin and evil, has until very recently been 
constructed predominantly by men, to the near exclusion of the 
experience and insights of women, inevitably means that there is 
essential corrective work to be done. Only thus can theology 
itself hope to be freed from the dehumanising effects of sin. 
At the same time, a new awareness of the fragility and delicate 
ecological balance of the environment has led to increased 
reflection on the human duty of stewardship for all creation and 
what this means in terms of concrete individual and collective 
moral responsibility. Here there are really parallels with the 
classical Christian view of justice as right relationships. Sally 
McFague explains: 'If the most basic meaning of justice is fairness 
then from an ecological point of view justice means sharing the 
limited resource of our common space.'" Ecological sin is quite 
simply then refusing or neglecting to share these resource with 
those who are most in need of them. It is also a failure to 
recognise the inherent goodness of the natural world. That 
goodness is a deeply rooted conviction throughout Scripture. 
After each of Yahweh's acts of creation the creation accounts 
recall that 'he found it very good' (Gen 1:3 1). Similarly the Psalms 
proclaim that 'the earth is the Lord's and all that is in it; the world 
and those who live in it, for he has founded it on the seas, and 
established it on the rivers (Ps 24:l-2). 
There is a pervasive recognition here that the world is not 
ours and that human beings are part of the created world. Made 
in the image of likeness of God, human beings are to reflect God 
to the rest of creation, to look after and care for the world and its 
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natural resources. There is the implication here of a caretaking 
role, a duty of stewardship, which is part of a grace-filled respect 
for the integrity of all creation. Such an attitude is directly 
opposed to the purely utilitarian stance, which considers natural 
resources to be expendable and disposable commodities. It is also 
a relational attitude, an attitude that calls for a rediscovery of our 
connectedness to and dependence on the earth. This sense of 
justice toward all creation had once found expression in the 
ancient Jewish tradition of the Sabbath law and the Jubilee Year. 
There was a sense of dowing the earth to replenish its resources 
and restore its energies during a fallow period. For theologians 
like McFague, Dorr, McDonagh and others, traditions like these 
bespeak a practical and ethical wisdom, which understands that 
the relationship between the earth and human beings, like the 
relationship between persons, must be one of mutual giving and 
receiving. 
Failure to respect this mutuality and reciprocity is a failure 
to act honestly and is therefore sinful. 'A land ethic that aims to 
preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic 
community is an example of living appropriately on the land 
and refusing to live the lie that we are the conquerors, the 
possessors and the masters of the earth.'" One can speak 
meaningfully therefore of ecological sin and of the need to 
encourage awareness of sustainability issues. Sollicitudo Rei 
Socialis argues for a greater realisation of 'the limits of available 
resources and of the need to respect the integrity and cycles of 
nature', as well as the 'mutual connection in an ordered system, 
which is precisely the cosmos'. 
Reverence for the earth is an ethical and religious imperative 
that touches our self-understanding in a profound way and 
which asks searching moral questions of our individual and 
collective lifestyles. Insofar as we refuse to recognise these 
questions or reject their import or fail to answer them in an 
adequate way, we also disregard the perennial summons to  'act 
justly, love tenderly and walk humbly with our God'. This 
rejection is what we have learned to call sin. 
The fields of political theology and liberation theology are the 
locus of some other recent attempts to contextualise the concept 
of sin. As with the ecological and the feminist perspectives, one 
cannot do justice to the breadth of industry and scholarship being 
undertaken in this field in a brief tour A'horizon such as this. In 
large measures the preoccupations of these theologies such as 
those of Johann Baptist Metz and Dorothee Solle have sought to 
develop theological reflection on sin and &t in the context of 
contemporary social relationships in the modern world. Their 
approach sets out specifically to challenge and critique the 
individual bias, which is a part of modern western culture. Metz's 
theology was influenced by his traumatic experiences of the 
Second World War. He and Solle raised the question of the 
suffering of innocent victims and of the large groups of people 
who are denied the opportunity of becoming 'subjects' due to 
political and social repression. According to them, there is a need 
for people to liberate themselves fiom the structures that impede 
their integral growth and development. What is required is a 
collective conversion, an 'anthropological revolution' where 
people emancipate themselves from the influences of 'privatism' 
and from the sinful tendencies of consumption and domination. 
This can only be achieved when collectively we are prepared to 
leave behind the competitiveness and egotism of our 'success 
ethic' and to realise the full implications of our status as 
essentially social beings. According to this view we must commit 
to an acceptance of responsibihty for ourselves, for the human 
family and for the world. 
When Christianity takes its place in the movement 
towards the development of world-wide 
community it will be able to express, in and for 
that great community, its understanding of a 
solidarity that is free from violence and hatred.24 
It is not hard to see how so-called political theology became the 
forerunner of so many contextualised theologies in the latter 
half of the twentieth century that were to lay great emphasis 
on the 'primacy of praxis' and the search for universal justice. 
That said, despite the radical tone of this approach there is also 
recognition here of what Metz calls the 'eschatological 
proviso'. This is an acknowledgement that God's promise of 
salvation will never be fully realised within history and that 
only the 'God of the living and the dead' ultimately can fulfil 
the promise of history. 
Western political theologies were to provide much 
inspiration for liberation theology, especially in their critique of 
a 'privatised ethic' that only camouflaged the true causes of sin. 
Many of the liberation theologians went for a distinction 
between social sin and individual sin which had social 
repercussions. They tended to do this by pointing to the 
differences between sin understood as 'communal', that is 
pertaining to the interpersonal dimension of primary 
relationships, and as 'societal' sin, which concerns the more 
complex, impersonal and structural secondary relationship. 
The human being was therefore at the nexus of a set of two- 
way mutually impacting relationships, each of which was 
vulnerable to the damaging and destructive effects of sin. 
Advances in human, political and economic science also 
provided the opportunity for a penetrating analysis of each of 
these relationships, thus bringing them into the theological 
foreground. In this way society's mechanisms were laid bare 
with the birth of the social sciences. They teach us that poverty, 
hunger, ignorance and misery don't just happen but are the 
demonstrable results of socio-economic and political 
 relationship^.^' And so liberation theologies argued for a social 
prismatic in all theological accounts of sin that would serve as 
a necessary antidote and corrective to a too-privatised moral 
climate and culture. They placed the poor at the centre, as 
those who most embodied the hope for change and liberation. 
They also reworked the great biblical motifs exemplified by the 
Exodus event as well as the New Testament emphasis on Jesus' 
compassion toward the poor. This they saw as only 
underscoring the importance of liberation in Christian life. In 
other words, liberations had to be seen in concrete, practical 
and tangible, as well as spiritual, ways. 
The sheer multiplicity of views within the liberation 
perspective makes any general comment on their theology of 
sin quite difficult. At one level it is but a reflection of the broad 
post-conciliar trends towards a renewed appreciation of the 
dignity of the human person and of the demands of social 
justice and is therefore advocating a more thorough and 
integral understanding of sin in all its dimensions. At another 
level some of its more radical exponents have been accused of 
substituting political salvation in history for external salvation 
and of underplaying 'the full ambit of sin whose first effect is 
to introduce disorder into the relationship between God and 
man and cannot be restricted to "social   in"'.'^ In any event, 
liberation theology has unquestionably been instrumental in 
the repositioning of theological emphases from the universal to 
the particular, the privileged to the deprived and the systematic 
to the narrative and performative." It has drawn much-needed 
attention to the disastrous human suffering caused by unjust 
institutions and structures, and has urged humanity, and 
especially faith communities, to take a responsible rule in 
fighting injustice and building solidarity. Perhaps though it is 
here that the advocates of social sin, understood in the 'hard' 
sense, are on their weakest ground. If one is really to  urge 
responsibility in social justice one must be prepared first to 
acknowledge the facts of responsibility and accountability as 
human possibilities and realities, otherwise the same 
determinisms which explain why sin will just as surely erode 
the very grounds for social action and responsibility. 
If there is a common strand or unifying theme in the so- 
called contextualised theologies it is their insistence on sin as 
opposition to Jesus' message, where kingdom is no mere 
extension of intrinsic human possibilities but a radical 
restructuring of inter-human relationships grounded in justice. 
What is more, this justice is not simply about corrective action 
or redress for wrongs that have been done; instead it is truly 
restorative and re-creative. Sin is understood as nothing less 
than the rejection of God's plan for filial and fraternal 
relationships, while justice on the other hand 'concretises the 
praxis of love and so realises the Kingdom'.'" 
In this optic there is room for much common ground between 
classical and contemporary theology because each in its own way 
presents sin as the human failure, whether individual or 
collective, to be what one is called to be and to realise the fullness 
of one's individual potentialities. A more dynamic understanding 
of creation and of the human person can thus allow the classical 
and the contemporary views to speak meaningfully to each other. 
It is here perhaps that the personalist and process perspectives 
are at their most valuable. While Boethius' definition of the 
human being as 'an individual substance of a rational nature' has 
proved a timeless insight and has become the bedrock of much 
ethical reflection and rights language and legislation, it does not 
capture in itself the fullness of the Judaeo-Christian concept of 
the person. In particular it fails to do justice to the 'dynamic 
nature of human existence, with its movement toward the 
fulfilling of aims or  goal^'.'^ 
One thinks here of Amos' concept of justice as represented 
by the river gently growing deeper and flowing toward the sea, 
of the case of an incremental line of advance and progression 
throughout the moral life. Perhaps there is a sense too in which 
the moral life may be seen as a task of becoming human, a task 
in which one is called to co-create with God. One is invited also 
to accept responsibility for one's life, and to gradually realise 
agapeic love both in one's own person and in communion with 
others. Understood in this light, sin is, above all, the failure to 
incarnate love and to cooperate with God in a great act of giving 
birth to a new koinonia. The recreative, regenerative process 
takes place first and foremost in the human heart, and all that is 
required is the cooperation of human fiee will - the willingness 
to surrender one's aspirations to self-sufficiency and to accept 
God's love and the implications of that love in outreach to others. 
This dynamic and synthetic view of creation and of human 
person sees the Imago Dei as at once gift and task. Each human 
being has been created in the image and likeness of the triune 
God and is therefore conferred with an undeniable dignity, but 
each is also called to make real that 'communion of love' which 
is the hallmark of the same triune God in his or her own life. 
This is the awesome but also potentially tragic adventure of 
human nature. Sin therefore represents one possible expression 
of that fieedom which is ultimately 'a refusal, whether small or 
great, of human destiny in its noblest reach'.'" 
Columbanus, the great Irish pilgrim monk, and author of a 
penitential handbook, once suggested in one of his sermons that 
each human being may ultimately determine the 'picture' that is 
to be painted in and through their lives. 'Let us not be the painters 
of another's image . . . for righteousness and righteousness . . . are 
opposed to one another. Then lest perhaps we should import into 1 
ourselves despotic images let Christ paint h s  image in us.'" I 
According to this view the moral life works gradually either to 11 
confirm the imprint of the Imago Dei upon one's entire being or  
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else to slowly replace it with the image of the tyrant - to whom 
or to which one has become enslaved. 
Even in these earliest theological reflections there was 
evidence of a synthetic, integral and holistic approach. There 
was also keen awareness of the continuous as well as the 
immediate aspects of moral behaviour. Indeed, it has also been 
the tenor of the vast learning and practical wisdom of the 
Christian tradition to regard both the immediate and 
continuous dimensions as co-essential aspects of the moral life. 
In other words, one has to allow each of these dimensions to 
co-exist in creative and complementary tension. 
Recent theology has therefore sought to root its reflections 
on sin in a more adequate synthetic and integral understanding 
of the human person. It has rediscovered the dramatic and 
incredible assertion at the heart of Matthew's account of the 
final judgment that 'as often as you did this to one of the least 
of these my brothers and sisters you did it also to me!' 
(Mt 25:31-46). To love others is therefore to love God, and 
conversely to fail others is to fail God. Sin is therefore not only 
a moral fault but also a religious failure. Recovery from sin 
challenges us in turn to a renewal of faith, to a renewed 
acceptance of the fact that the path away from sin and toward 
healing and wholeness cannot be travelled alone. Growth out 
of sin is but another way of describing our own personal part 
in the ongoing story of humankind as it continues its struggle 
toward the realisation of the kingdom of God." It is here too 
that the lament for sin and the sadness of the contrite heart 
become a joyful sorrow. For in truth we are only able to mourn 
and lament when we really appreciate what we have lost. A 
genuine grasp of the 'reality of sin' becomes therefore the first 
moment of our encounter with God. This is the moment when 
we truly discover the awesome extent of His love. 
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